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Do psi-ontology theorems prove that the wave function is not epistemic?
I. Schmelzer
As a counterexample to ψ-ontology theorems we consider a ψ-epistemic interpretation of the wave
function in the configuration space representation with a configuration space trajectory defining the
ontology. This shows that ψ-ontology theorems appear unable to prove that the wave function
cannot be interpreted as epistemic.
We identify the criterion used to decide if ψ is epistemic or ontological as the misleading part.
Different states having overlaps is only sufficient for being epistemic. In an epistemic interpretation
the information which completely identifies the wave function also has an objective base in reality
– the preparation procedure, which has to be really executed to prepare a state.
Naming the λ ∈ Λ “hidden variables” and considering them as part of the state of the system we
also identify as misleading, because it hides the possibility that they may be visible and external to
the system. This leads to further misconceptions about the consequences of the theorems.
But in 1952 I saw the impossible done.
J.S. Bell
I. A MISLEADING THEOREM
Recently, a new type of impossibility theorems has ap-
peared – the so-called ψ-ontology theorems. Their aim is
to exclude epistemic interpretations of the wave function
by showing that the wave function has to be part of the
ontology of quantum theory. Particular examples are [1],
[2], [3], for an extended review of this research, see Leifer
[4]. We will mainly refer to [1], but the problem is shared
by other variants of the theorem too. What is claimed
is that such theorems “show that any model in which
a quantum state represents mere information about an
underlying physical state of the system must make pre-
dictions which contradict those of quantum theory”, as
claimed in [1].
But, similar to Bell in the case of the impossibility
theorems of hidden variables, I saw the impossible done,
in a ψ-epistemic realist interpretation of quantum theory
named “entropic dynamics”. It has been proposed 2011
by Caticha [5].
The question appears what is wrong: Is it the impossi-
bility theorem or the explicit counterexample? As usual
(for example in no-hidden-variables theorems), there is
no error, neither in the theorems themselves (which prove
what is claimed) nor in the ψ-epistemic interpretation.
Simply, if one looks at the ψ-epistemic interpretation,
and compares it with the definition, it appears to be,
formally, a ψ-ontological interpretation too.
So, the theorem is not wrong but misleading, because
it relies on a misleading definition of ψ-ontology. A def-
inition of ψ-ontological interpretations where a clearly
ψ-epistemic interpretation appears to be ψ-ontological
should be rejected as inappropriate.
Behind this, we identify yet another misleading con-
cept – the idea that a space Λ which allows to compute
the expectation values of quantum observables o in de-
pendence of choices a of what to measure by the formula
E(o|a) =
∫
λ∈Λ
o(a, λ)ρ(λ)dλ. (1)
somehow has to be a space of “hidden variables of the
quantum system”. But nothing prevents to use quite
visible elements of the external world (or the theoreti-
cal discourse about it) as elements of the space Λ. This
is what, essentially, allows an epistemic interpretation
of the wave function, where it describes the knowledge
about the (objective, real, but external) preparation pro-
cedures to define a probability distribution over Λ.
II. A VARIANT OF CATICHA’S “ENTROPIC
DYNAMICS”
Given that Caticha’s “entropic dynamics” from 2011
[5] has not been cited in the review article of Leifer [4], it
cannot be assumed to be known even by those working in
this domain. Thus, for self-consistency, I will start with
a short introduction into the basic concepts. In fact, I
will present a slightly modified version.
The goal of Caticha was “to derive quantum theory as
an application of entropic inference”. The interpretation
has formal similarities with Nelsonian stochastic mechan-
ics [6]. In particular, it uses the same fundamental ontol-
ogy, defined by the particle positions in non-relativistic
many particle theory. I prefer, instead, to specify the
fundamental ontology in a slightly more general way, as
defined by some classical configuration space Qsys of the
quantum system1.
Caticha’s basic assumption is that “in addition to the
particles of interest there exist some extra variables”.
“The number and nature of the extra variables . . . and
the origin of their uncertainty need not be specified”. I
1 All what one needs for the formalism to work is that the energy
depends on the momentum variables in a quadratic form, H =
〈p, p〉+V (q). This is fulfilled, in particular, for many relativistic
fields, as well as their spatial lattice regularizations.
2will use this freedom to specify them nonetheless, namely
as the part Qext of the configuration space of the whole
universe Quniv which is external, outside the system un-
der consideration, so that Quniv ∼= Qsys × Qext. In the
language of the Copenhagen interpretation, it would be
named the classical part, but in Caticha’s approach we
do not have to make nontrivial assumptions about this
external part, like that it follows classical equations.
Now, following Bayesian logic, incomplete knowledge
about the world would be described by a probability dis-
tribution ρ(qsys, qext)dqsysdqext on the space which de-
scribes the ontology, that means, on Qsys×Qext. Accord-
ing to Caticha’s interpretation, what defines the wave
function of the system is defined by this global proba-
bility distribution by the following formulas: First, the
resulting probability distribution for the configurations
of the system qsys ∈ Qsys, defined by:
ρ(qsys) =
∫
Qext
ρ(qsys, qext)dqext,
together with the entropy of the rest of the world given
the system is in a particular configuration qsys ∈ Qsys,
defined by
S(qsys) = −
∫
Qext
ln ρ(qsys, qext)ρ(qsys, qext)dqext.
These functions will define the phase of the wave function
by
φ(qsys) = S(qsys)− ln ρ
1
2 (qsys)
and the wave function itself by
ψ(qsys) = ρ
1
2 (qsys)e
i
~
φ(qsys).
For further details, in particular the derivation of the
Schro¨dinger equation, we can refer to the original pa-
per [5], given that it is not relevant here. The known
objections are also not relevant: The necessity of a pre-
ferred frame is shared with all realistic interpretations
because of Bell’s theorem, and the Wallstrom objection
[7, 8] shows only that the interpretation is in fact a dif-
ferent theory, with the additional restriction that in the
configuration space |ψ|2(q) > 0 everywhere2. Even if
this restriction would not be viable empirically, it would
nonetheless define a ψ-epistemic realistic interpretation
of quantum theory with a Schro¨dinger equation, thus,
provide a counterexample to the goal of ψ-ontology the-
orems.
2 The viability depends on the choice of the configuration space. In
[10] it is argued that for a field ontology an empirical falsification
would become more problematic in comparison with a particle
ontology.
III. A MISLEADING DEFINITION OF WHAT IS
ONTOLOGICAL
So let’s take a look at what is wrong with the PBR
theorem. For this, it appears sufficient to look at what
is proven:
Suppose that, for any pair of distinct quan-
tum states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, the distributions
µ0(λ) and µ1(λ) do not overlap: then, the
quantum state |ψ〉 can be inferred uniquely
from the physical state of the system and
hence satisfies the above definition of a phys-
ical property. Informally, every detail of
the quantum state is ’written into’ the real
physical state of affairs. But if µ0(λ) and
µ1(λ) overlap for at least one pair of quantum
states, then |ψ〉 can justifiably be regarded as
’mere’ information.
Our main result is that for distinct quantum
states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, if the distributions µ0(λ)
and µ1(λ) overlap (more precisely: if ∆, the
intersection of their supports, has non-zero
measure) then there is a contradiction with
the predictions of quantum theory. [1]
Would Caticha’s interpretation fulfill the non-overlap
condition, which is used to define ψ-ontology? To answer
this question, we have to remember what fixes the wave
function. According to the minimal interpretation, to
prepare a pure state we need some preparation procedure.
It is defined by a measurement device measuring some
maximal set of commuting operators ~A and a particular
choice of eigenvalues ~a of these operators. An unknown
initial state of the system has, then, to be measured with
the measurement device, and if the measurement gives
the result ~a, then the system is prepared in the eigenstate
|ψ~a〉 so that ~A|ψ~a〉 = ~a|ψ~a〉. This is the information we
need, else we would not know that the system is prepared
in the particular state |ψ~a〉.
Now, the state of this measurement device is defined by
its configuration qext ∈ Qext, which is part of the external
world. The measurement results also have to be stored
somewhere outside the system, as part of qext ∈ Qext.
But a particular measurement device which measured ~A
and has obtained the particular result ~a has prepared
a state with the wave function |ψ~a〉 and no other wave
function. So, the real state of the external part qext ∈
Qext defines if a particular state |ψ~a〉 has been prepared
or not.
Can there be any overlap between the qext preparing
eigenstates |ψ~a〉 of A and those preparing eigenstates |ψ~b〉
of some other B? Certainly not. There may be many dif-
ferent preparation procedures qext all preparing the same
state |ψ~a〉 of A. But the preparation procedures for dif-
ferent operators differ, and different eigenstates prepared
by the same preparation measurement differ nonetheless
in the results of this initial measurement. So, there can
3be no overlap, and therefore, if we follow the considera-
tion quoted above, “every detail of the quantum state is
’written into’ the real physical state of affairs”.
So, it is not the theorem itself which is the problem.
What the theorem proves – that an overlap would lead
to a contradiction with quantum predictions – is unprob-
lematic because there is none in our ψ-epistemic interpre-
tation.
IV. STATE OF THE SYSTEM OR STATE OF
THE WORLD?
Let’s note that there is a difference in the interpreta-
tion of the meaning of “hidden variables”:
The result is in the same spirit as Bell’s theo-
rem [.], which states that no local theory can
reproduce the predictions of quantum theory.
Both theorems need to assume that a sys-
tem has a objective physical state λ such that
probabilities for measurement outcomes de-
pend only on λ. [1]
In the ψ-epistemic interpretation considered above this
is not the case – the information which defines the wave
function is not part of the physical state of the system,
but part of the world outside of the system – it is con-
tained in the preparation device and the result of the
preparation measurement.
Thus, the “hidden variables” λ of the “state of the
system” are in the epistemic interpretation neither part
of the system nor hidden. Instead, they simply contain
the “incomplete knowledge” which defines the wave func-
tion, because it is part of the complete ontology of the
universe. There is nothing in assumptions of the theo-
rem which would force the variables to be hidden or to be
defined by the system taken alone instead of the whole
world. So, it is only this implicit assumption which is the
problem, and not that the epistemic interpretation does
not fulfill this assumption.
V. MISLEADING CONSEQUENCES
This confusion is not innocent, because it suggests con-
sequences which are not justified.
The wave function being something defined by hidden
variables of the system itself would require some sort of
additional degrees of freedom beyond the configuration
space trajectory of the system, variables able to store
quite arbitrary wave functions. While it does not fol-
low in any strong sense, what seems natural would be
some sort of storage sufficient to describe arbitrary wave
functions. The epistemic interpretation above shows that
there is no necessity for any such additional storage inside
the system.
Another implicit assumption would be that this stor-
age would have to be very large, able to store arbitrary
wave functions. To quote PBR [1]:
. . . the quantum state has the striking prop-
erty that the number of real parameters
needed to specify it is exponential in the num-
ber of systems n. This is to be expected if the
quantum state represents information but is –
to us – very surprising if it has a direct image
in reality.
The phrase “has a direct image in reality” suggests a
connection which does not exist, namely a map from the
space of all possible wave functions into the space Λ which
defines the ontology of the theory. If one looks at what
we really have in the epistemic interpretation, we find a
map from particular preparation procedures (that means,
from some subset of possible real states of the external
world where pure states of the system have been prepared
qprep ∈ Qprep ⊂ Qext into the space of wave functions of
the system ψ(qsys) ∈ L
2(Qsys).
It follows that the set of possible wave functions is
restricted by the set of possible configurations of the ex-
ternal world, a world of the same type as the quantum
system itself, defined by a single configuration qext ∈ Qext
instead of a wave function ψ(qsys) ∈ L
2(Qsys).
In other words, there is no image of a wave function in
reality. There may be only a pre-image. And it is quite
plausible that the existence of such a pre-image will be a
rare exception instead of the rule.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have found that the definition of what defines a
ψ-ontological theory is seriously misleading, because it
classifies a clearly ψ-epistemic interpretation of Schro¨-
dinger theory as ψ-ontological.
As the confusion behind this misleading definition we
have identified the very notion of “hidden variables of a
system” λ ∈ Λ which define measurement results o in
dependence of decisions of the experimenters a by
It is somehow presumed that this space Λ defines a
space of elements which are, first of all, hidden, and,
moreover, part of the quantum system. But in the case
of the epistemic interpretation we have used as a coun-
terexample, the space Λ contains, together with the con-
figuration of the system, also the configuration of the
external world, thus, it is neither hidden nor part of the
system.
In the proofs using this formula nothing depends on
these implicit assumptions. So, they can be applied also if
the space Λ is a visible part of the external world. As long
as this is not recognized, it has misleading consequences.
In the case of Bell’s theorem, the misleading part is
that one can somehow get rid of the formula by reject-
ing “realism” which requires it for some space of “hid-
den variables”. One cannot, because the space Λ can
4be constructed in the objective Bayesian probability in-
terpretation – the “logic of plausible reasoning”, simply
starting with all the propositions under consideration the
particular field of discourse, namely as the set of all “log-
ically imaginable possibilities” – logically consistent as-
signments of truth values to all propositions [11]. So, the
rejection-of-realism loophole does not exist, those who
believe in it are misguided.
The fate of the ψ-ontology theorems is similar. They
implicitly depend on the assumption that something non-
trivial about the “hidden variables of the system” has
been proven. But the space of “hidden variables of the
system” can simply include the whole preparation proce-
dure, which is visible and external. Once this is under-
stood, it becomes clear that a ψ-epistemic interpretation,
where the implicit knowledge about a pure state is based
on the knowledge of the objective preparation procedure
used to prepare it, may become a ψ-ontological inter-
pretation if one follows the definition – simply because
the “hidden variables of the system” contain that visible
preparation procedure located in the external world too.
Those who believe that it follows from the theorems that
the wave function should be interpreted as part of the
ontology are misguided.
To summarize, the ψ-ontology theorems are unable to
show that the wave function is not purely epistemic, and
misleading by suggesting this. This has been shown ex-
plicitly by the presentation of a clearly ψ-epistemic in-
terpretation of the wave function based on an ontology
completely described by a single configuration space tra-
jectory.
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